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Shocking the Eighth Amendment's
Conscience: Applying a Substantive Due
Process Test to the Evolving Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause
by JENCY MEGAN BUTLER*
A good act does not wash out the bad, nor a bad act the
good. Each should have its own reward.
-George R. R. Martin, A Clash of Kings (1998)1
[T]hose who framed and approved the Federal Constitution
chose, for whatever reason, not to include within it the
guarantee against disproportionate sentences.
-Justice Scalia, Harmelin v. Michigan (1991)2
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.3
Introduction
From Rodney King in Los Angeles to Michael Brown in Ferguson,
America has increasingly become aware of police officers using excessive
force or committing other rights violations. 4 Excessive-force claims seem
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2012,
Santa Clara University. Special thanks to Debashish Bakshi, Jennifer Horn Chen, and Professor
Evan Lee for the motivation, my family and friends for the support, and the fine editors of
Hastings Constitutional Quarterly who worked tirelessly to finalize this Note.
1. GEORGE R. R. MARTFN, A CLASH OF KINGS 460 (Bantam 2003).
2. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985 (1991).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
4. See generally JEFFREY IAN ROSS, MAKING NEWS OF POLICE VIOLENCE (2000);
Editorial Board, Justice Department's Ferguson Report Points to the Devastating Consequences
of Routine Rights Violations and Racial Bias: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 7, 2015, 6:58
PM), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/20 15/03/justiceedepartments-fcrguson-r.html
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to constantly be in the news.5 Though depressing, this constant coverage of
excessive-force cases does shape American citizens' views on guaranteed
constitutional protections. What Americans do not typically understand are
the valuable theories and philosophy that grow out of excessive-force case
law. For example, recent history has brought to light a longstanding test
that can and should be used to clarify confusing Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
The United States Supreme Court has been split, or indecisive, for
some time on whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits disproportionate
punishments. The principle of proportionality, within the Eighth
Amendment, commands that a criminal sentence be proportionate to the
committed crime. Proportionality, in the context of general law, spurs
notions of fairness, justice, and balance. 6 In criminal law, proportionality is
"the notion that the punishment should fit the crime." 7 Intuitively, most
people agree that there should be a correlation between the severity of a
crime and the degree of suffering in the enforced punishment. This is in
part due to proportional punishments having roots in early American
philosophy. For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized proportionality as part of the Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment analysis. 8 Further, the accepted practice of the death
penalty has increased discussion of proportionality within the Eighth
Amendment. 9 This discussion of the principle of proportionality continues
to be important regardless of whether the conversation is going nowhere
under the current Court.
An originalist argument claims that proportionality is incompatible
with consequentialist goals of punishment.' ° This note challenges such a
view, reasoning that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires
(U.S. Justice Department released a report that concluded that Ferguson, Missouri police officers
used excessive force and committed other rights violations against blacks.).
5. An informal search of the San Francisco Chronicle and San Jose Mercury websites
revealed dozens of articles dealing with charges and settlements of excessive-force claims over
the last ten years.
6. Howard J. Alperin, Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional Provisions
Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A. L.R. 3d 335 (1970).
7. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,31 (2003).
8. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
9. The Supreme Court has subsequently invoked the principle of proportionality to hold
that the death penalty is prohibited for the rape of an adult woman, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977), for offenders who formed no intcnt to kill, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982),
for juveniles, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541, 560 (2005), or are mentally retarded, Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
10. lan P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality and the
Eighth Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 321 (2010).
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proportionality. In fact, as recent as 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
proportionality within Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in Graham v.
Florida.1" Other federal and state courts have since used the principle of
proportionality to hold that certain lengthy prison sentences are
unconstitutional because they are grossly disproportionate. 2 Nevertheless,
regardless of the Court relying on the principle of proportionality for over
120 years, it still rcmains divided in accepting proportionality within the
Eighth Amendment.' 3 The Court's Justices over the years have disagreed
on whether proportionality applies depending on punishment type or solely
to unusual punishments, 14 whether the Eighth Amendment forbids grossly
disproportionate punishments, and how to objectively determine whether a
punishment is proportionate to a crime.15
This Note will argue that proportionality should be naturally read into
the Eighth Amendment. First, a brief historical discussion of the Eighth
Amendment will illustrate that proportionality is essential within the
doctrine. Second, Part II will review proportionality within Supreme Court
Eighth Amendment precedents. Third, the Note looks at proportionality in
the lens of substantive due process, namely in the context of excessive-
force cases. Fourth, this Note proposes that the "shocks the conscience"
standard can and should provide guidance to the proportionality question
that divides the Supreme Court. Some of the criticisms, mainly the
dissimilarities between Eighth Amendment and substantive due process,
regarding the "shocks the conscience" test are also addressed. Because the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this issue is notoriously lacking in
clarity, this note provides a workable solution.' 6 The Supreme Court has
had near unanimity in this field, and perhaps this note's proposal, at the
very least, may give the Court pause before construing the Eighth
Amendment without the principle of proportionality.
11. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, No. l:07-CR-196-BBM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104437 (N.D. Ga., Sept. 2, 2008) (a thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence for crossing a state
line with the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with a person under twelve years old is
grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Bradshaw v. The State, 671
S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2008) (a sentence of life imprisonment for a second failure to register as a sex
offender is grossly disproportionate to the crime, and therefore unconstitutional).
13. The proportionality principle was first referred to by a dissenting judge in the earlier
case of O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), but Weems was the first decision in which the
holding was based upon a requirement of proportionality.
14. Like the death penalty or torture.
15. See Part III.A below for a discussion of these cases.
16. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) ("Our precedents in this area have not
been a model of clarity."); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) ("Though
our decisions recognize a proportionality principle, its precise contours are unclear.").
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I. History of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
American citizens from being forced to pay extremely high amounts of
money for bail if they are accused of a crime, being charged exorbitant
fines, and from cruel and unusual punishments being inflicted upon them
by the government.' 7 The Eighth Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights,
the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.' 8 Our nation's
Founding Fathers desired giving the people power in their government,
instead of placing government in the hands of arbitrary rulers and judges. 9
The Kingdom of England previously inflicted excessive bail amounts and
cruel and unusual punishments on their citizens.20
The Eighth Amendment is rooted in British law. 21 The Magna Carta
of 1215 purported the idea that punishments should fit their respective
crimes. 22 In 1689, the English Bill of Rights was created by Parliament,
affirming that "cruel and unusual punishments" ought not to be inflicted. 3
The Titus Oates case is a famous example of the first application of the
English Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 4  Titus Oates, an
Anglican cleric, was convicted of lying in court. Oates's lies resulted in
26the execution of fifteen innocent people. Oates was sentenced to
imprisonment, annual pillory, and one day of whipping.27 What offended
the English Members of Parliament was that the pillory would occur
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Id.
19. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
20. Stephen E. Meltzer, Harmelin v. Michigan: Contemporary Morality and Constitutional
Objectivity, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 749, 784 (1993).
21. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 1 (1964).
22. Magna Carta (1215) ("A free man shall not be [fined] for a small offense unless
according to the measure of the offense, and for a great offense he shall be [fined] according to
the greatness of the offense."). The Magna Carta was the first English document that placed
restrictions on the sovereign from violating certain agreed-upon rights of the people. Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1983).
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,243 (1972).
24. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969 (1991).
25. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 933 n.150 (2011).
26. Id.
27. Id. Pillory and whipping were common punishments at the time of the Oates case.
Pillory is a device where the person's head and hands are secured in a wooden frame, which is
usually placed in a public place where a passerby can taunt them and throw garbage at them. The
main purpose for such a device is public humiliation. DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.
referencc.com/browsc/pillory (last visited Mar 30, 2015).
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annually, and the repetition of pillory made the punishment excessive and
28disproportionate.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason,
mirrored the English Bill of Rights.2 9 Thomas Jefferson is thought to have
drawn many of the concepts for the Declaration of Independence directly
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights.30 Our nation's Founding Fathers
sought to prevent government abuse and James Madison, author of the Bill
of Rights, included the Eighth Amendment in his original list of twelve
amendments.3' Congress ultimately adopted ten amendments to make the
Bill of Rights, which included the Eighth Amendment.
32
Courts today do not uniformly scrutinize violations of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause within the Eighth Amendment. For example,
some jurisdictions have held that the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment.33  Other courts see death as appropriate for certain capital
crimes.34
II. The Eighth Amendment and Proportionality
The Supreme Court has not been clear on whether all sentences should
be proportional to a completed crime. Overall, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids some punishments entirely, while
prohibiting other punishments that are excessive in comparison to the
crime. Nonetheless, Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence
lacks clarity. Thus, courts below have struggled in determining whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibits disproportionate punishments.
28. Stinncford, supra note 25, at 934.
29. Id. at 944 n.210. The Virginia Declaration of Rights was the first statement of
individual rights by an American government. Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and
Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 938 (2002).
30. Id.
31. Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 675 n. 110 (2004).
32. Id. at 679.
33. Currently, nineteen states and the District of Columbia no longer permit the death
penalty. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-withoutdcath-penalty (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). In
addition, internationally, 140 countries have abolished capital punishment from either law or
practice. See Death Penalty Trends, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http:// www.amnestyusa.org/our
-work/issucs/death-penalty/us-death-pcnalty-facts/dcath-penalty-trends (last visited Nov. 10,
2015).
34. See Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty#BJS (last visited Nov. 7,
2015).
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The Supreme Court first suggested that the Eighth Amendment
requires the punishment be proportional to the offense in O'Neil v.
Vermont.35 In his dissent, Justice Field stated that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause not only prohibited torture, but "all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to
the offense charged.,
36
Eighteen years later, the principle of proportionality was used to
overturn the sentence given in Weems v. United States. 37 Weems was
charged with falsifying public and official documents for the purposes of
defrauding the government. 38 He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen
years of incarceration, which included being chained from wrist to ankle
and being compelled to do "hard and painful labor." 39  Delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice McKenna determined that the fifteen-year
prison sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment because to serve Weem's sentence would have
been "repugnant to the Bill of Rights." 4° Justice McKenna reasoned, "it is
a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense. 4 1 Chief Justice White, in his dissent, asserted that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause embraced prohibitions against
"inhuman bodily punishments of the past," as well as application of
customary bodily punishments in an unusually severe manner, or judicial
infliction of unusual, "not bodily," punishments that were not authorized by
statute or were not otherwise within the discretion of the court to impose.
42
He did not agree with the majority in that there was "any assumed role of
35. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,340 (1892) (O'Neil was convicted of 307 offenses of
selling intoxicating liquor without authority. He was fined $6,638.72 and required to "stand
committed" until the fine was paid, with the proviso that if the fine was not paid in full by a
certain date, "he should be confined at hard labor. . . for the term of 19,914 days" (approximately
fifty-four-and-a-half years)). Id. at 330. Please note that the Eighth Amendment had not yet been
applied to the states: The majority of the Court did not address whether the sentence violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
36. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J. dissenting).
37. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). As a side note, the Court was applying
not the Eighth Amendment but a statutory Bill of Rights to the Philippines, which it interpreted as
having the same meaning. Id. at 367. The Court concluded that "[t]his contrast shows more than
different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in
this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a difference between unrestrained power and that which
is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice." Id. at 357.
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 364.
40. Id. at 382.
41. d. at 367.
42. Id. at 390 (White, J. dissenting).
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apportionment" that the punishment fit the crime.43 Weems can be viewed
as establishing the "principle of proportionality," where the punishment
should be relative to the crime.
Despite Weems, the Court rarely used proportionality in subsequent
cases to explicitly invalidate a form of punishment. However, the Court
implicitly used the principle in several cases. For example, in Trop v.
Dules,44 the Court held that deprivation of citizenship could not be used as
punishment, regardless of how reprehensible a crime might be.45 Neither
the majority nor dissent explicitly precluded proportionality within the
Eighth Amendment.46 The Trop Court seems to have used the principle of
proportionality to determine that the punishment could not be considered
disproportionate to the committed crime.4 7
Since Weems, Supreme Court Justices have turned away from reading
proportionality into the Eighth Amendment and have instead adopted the
position that the Eighth Amendment only insures certain punishments are
forbidden regardless of the circumstances. 48 Certain punishments that have
been unequivocally prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, in violation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, include taking away
49
citizenship from an American citizen, executing a minor convicted of a
crime, 50 and sentencing a minor to life without the possibility of parole for
any crime besides murder.5' Some punishments, including lethal injection,
hanging, firing squad, and electric chair, have been challenged as violations
of the Eighth Amendment, but the Courts have determined that they are not
cruel and unusual.52 The Supreme Court has also determined that prison
43. Id. at 398 (White, J. dissenting).
44. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
45. Id. at 92-93. The Court concluded that, because of the peculiar nature of the penalty of
denationalization, the punishment offended the "principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment." Id. at 99.
46. See generally id.
47. Chief Justice Warren, in announcing the Court's opinion, noted, "[s]ince wartime
desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is
excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime." Id. at 99.
48. Further, the Court has also held that a person's status cannot dictate punishment. For
example, it would be a violation of the Eighth Amendment to punish an individual because of the
person's status of having a specific illness or addiction. This means that punishments can only be
handed out for actions that are committed. See Part ll.A for examples of these cases.
49. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
50. See Part III.B.
51. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); see also People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d
245 (Cal. 2014).
52. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008). The majority of Americans still find lethal
injection, hanging, the firing squad, and the electric chair to be justifiable punishments. In reality,
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conditions for those who have been convicted can be cruel and unusual.53
Determining whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual has not been
an easy task for the Court, leading to inconsistency in lower state and
federal courts.
A. The Principle of Proportionality Applied in Specific Cases
1. Status
The Eighth Amendment was not applied to the states until the decision
in Robinson v. California.54  Four years after Trop, the Court held the
statute in Robinson to be unconstitutional because it punished the status of
being an addict without any requirement of a showing that a defendant had
ever used narcotics within the jurisdiction or had committed any act.5
Additionally, the Court reasoned addiction is an illness that physiologically
compels the victim to do drugs.56  This case stands for either the
proposition that one may not be punished for a status in the absence of
some act, or the broader principle that it is cruel and unusual to punish
someone for conduct she is unable to control, a holding of sweeping
consequence. Justice Stewart did not explicitly refer to proportionality, but
argued one depended on the relationship between the offense committed
and the punishment to determine whether the punishment is cruel and
unusual.57 He stated, "[t]o be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the
question cannot be answered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common
cold.
, 58
lethal injection is the standard form of capital punishment that is still practiced, although one
person was executed in Utah by firing squad in 2010 and one by electrocution in Virginia in 2010
as well. No one has been executed by hanging in the United States since 1996. Id; Methods of
Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-
execution (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
53. Such things as unnecessarily harsh treatment, lack of basic life necessities, racial
segregation for reasons other than prison security and restrictions on one's ability to petition the
government for redress of grievances would fall into this category. See generally Jason D.
Sanabria, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth
Amendment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1113 (1995).
54. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
55. Id. at 678. Interestingly, Robinson applied the Eighth Amendment to a state punishment
for the first time. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 422 n.4 (1972).
56. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 671.
57. Id. at 667.
58. Id. The concurrence of Justice Douglas invoked proportionality more directly: "The
question presented in the earlier cases concerned the degree of severity with which a particular
offense was punished or the clement of cruelty present. A punishment out of all proportion to the
[Vol. 43:4
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The Court in Powell v. Texas took the latter view of Robinson-that it
is cruel and unusual to punish someone for conduct she is unable to
control.59 The Court invalidated a conviction of an alcoholic for public
drunkenness.
60
2. Rape
After the Court revived the death penalty in 1976,61 the court used
proportionality widely in disseminating new jurisprudence surrounding
capital punishment. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court held that
"a sentence of death, is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment
for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment
as cruel and unusual punishment. ' '62 The Coker Court reasserted that the
Eighth Amendment barred not only barbaric punishments, but also
disproportionate punishments that did not fit the crime.63 It is interesting to
note that while there were a number of different opinions within the
Court's decision, not one member of the Court overtly opposed the
principle of proportionality within the Eighth Amendment.
64
Additionally, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court held that capital
punishment was disproportionate to the crime of raping a child less than
twelve years old.65  The Court reasoned that the death penalty is only
proportional "for crimes that take the life of the victim."
66
3. Murder
In Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that capital punishment for a
person convicted of felony murder that "does not himself kill, attempt to
kill, or intend that a killing take place," is not proportional. 67  Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent, even recognized that the Eighth Amendment
offense may bring it within the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishments' .... [T]hc principle
that would deny power to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also deny power to
punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being sick." Id. at 676.
59. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
60. Id. at 532.
61. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
62. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
63. Id. at 591.
64. See id
65. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 449 (2008).
66. Id. at 447.
67. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
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forbid disproportionate punishments, 68 although she finally concluded, "the
death penalty is not disproportionate to the crime of felony murder.,
69
The Court in Atkins v. Virginia held that the death penalty was
disproportionate and excessive when applied to mentally retarded
persons.70  The Roper v. Simmons Court similarly held that the death
penalty for juvenile homicide offenders was also a disproportionate
punishment. 1
B. The Current State of Proportionality Within the Eighth Amendment
The Court has gone back and forth in its recognition of proportionality
in noncapital cases. Particularly, the Supreme Court has suggested that
proportionality should only be applied to certain types of punishment. For
example, Rummel v. Estelle upheld mandatory life sentence under a
recidivist statute following a third felony conviction, even though the
defendant's three nonviolent felonies were minimal.72 The rule that came
out of Rummel appeared to be that states might punish any behavior that is
classified as a felony with any length of imprisonment. Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Court should not invalidate the imprisonment on
proportionality grounds and instead suggested that the proportionality
principle was clearer with respect to specific modes of punishment (such as
torture) than with respect to differences of degree (such as terms of
imprisonment).73
In Solem v. Helm, the Court held unequivocally that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause "prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but
also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed," and that
"[t]here is no basis for the State's assertion that the general principle of
proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences. 74 The Court
viewed Helm's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole as more severe than the one described in Rummel.75 The Court in
Solem spelled out the objective criteria by which proportionality issues
should be judged: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
68. Id. at 811.
69. Id. at 827 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
70. See supra note 9.
71. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
72. Rummel v. Estellc, 445 U.S. 263, 295 (1980) ("In total, the three crimes involved
slightly less than $ 230.").
73. Id. at 275.
74. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
75. Id. at 301 (1983) (describing Rummel as not convincing, distinguishing precedent).
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jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions. 76  Using these objective factors, the Court
held Helm's sentence was cruel and unusual because it was significantly
disproportionate to his crime, and was therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendments.
Despite this holding, the Court was closely divided, particularly in
regard to the facts (crime of uttering a "no account" check for $100).78
Chief Justice Burger's dissent focused on the majority's inability to respect
precedent. 79 The dissent argued that proportionality is not included in the
Eighth Amendment and such a principle went against stare decisis with
respect to Rummel.
80
In 1991, the Court again changed its course with its decision in
Harmelin v. Michigan.8t The Court held that it is not unconstitutional for
one to get life imprisonment for a nonviolent drug crime (possession of 672
82grams of cocaine). Justice Scalia argued, "Solem was simply wrong; the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. 83  He also
argued "only certain modes or methods of punishment were prohibited.,
84
With respect to the length of the sentence, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Souter argued that there is a narrow proportionality principle in the
Eighth Amendment. 85 These three Justices concurred in Scalia's plurality
opinion, however, emphasizing the fact that the crime was severe and not
grossly disproportionate to the sentence given.8 6 Therefore, the Court held
that severe mandatory penalties might be cruel, but were not necessarily
unusual because states have been employing such sentences throughout
history.
87
76. Id. at 290-92.
77. Id. at 288. The Solem majority consisted of the remaining three Justices from the
dissent in Rummel together with Justice O'Connor, and Justice Blackmun, who had voted with
the majority in Rummel. The other members of the Rummel majority made up the rigorous Solem
dissent. See Id.
78. Id. at 296.
79. Id. at 304 (Burger, J. dissenting).
80. Id. (Burger, J. dissenting).
81. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 956 (1991).
82. id. at 996.
83. Id. at 965.
84. Id. at 979.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1008.
87. id. at 994-95.
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Moreover, in Ewing v. California, the Court upheld a recidivist statute
against an Eighth Amendment challenge. 88 California's three-strikes law
was under review for the possibility that the sentence being imposed was
grossly disproportionate. 89 The implicated crime was theft of golf clubs, a
crime that the Court did not consider to be particularly serious. 90 Ewing
was a plurality opinion, but the Court ultimately held that California's
three-strikes law was not grossly disproportionate, and therefore not
unconstitutional. 91 The plurality upheld the broad Solem approach to the
Eighth Amendment. Three Justices reiterated that the Eighth Amendment
92
contains a narrow proportionality principle. Justice Breyer rearticulated
the "threshold of gross disproportionality" in his dissent.93 Two Justices,
Scalia and Thomas, argued that the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee at all.94
In its 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision, the Court, by a slim five-to-
four majority, held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the mandatory
sentencing of life in prison without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for
juvenile homicide offenders.95  Writing for the majority, Justice Elena
Kagan argued that children are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing purposes. 96 She further concluded that while LWOP for adults
does not violate the Eighth Amendment, such a sentence is an
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for children. 97 Once again,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, emphasized the absence of
proportionality within the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
98
88. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 13 (2003).
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id. at 29-30.
92. Id. at 24-25. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor announced the opinion of the Court, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy concurring. See id. Note that in Harmelin, Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in claiming that the Eighth Amendment contained no
proportionality principle, but joined Justice O'Connor's assertion in Ewing that the Eighth
Amendment did contain a narrow proportionality principle, applicable to both capital and
noncapital punishments.
93. Id. at 36-37.
94. Justices Scalia and Thomas consistently argued that the Eighth Amendment does not
include a proportionality requirement betwcen punishments and committed crimes. Id. at 32.
95. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
96. Id. at 2464.
97. Id. at 2469.
98. Id. at 2483 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Court's most recent decision in cruel and unusual jurisprudence is
Glossip v. Gross.99 In Glossip, the Court once again doubled back and
disregarded the principle of proportionality when determining whether a
certain type of drug used in lethal injections violated the Eighth
Amendment.1°° Additionally, in his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
explicitly stated that the proportionality principle has long been
discredited.'0 ' After Glossip, lower courts continue to struggle with what
to make of the principle of proportionality. Nonetheless, never having been
explicitly overruled, Ewing v. California represents the law today: The only
limit to the Eighth Amendment in place is whether the punishment is
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Ill. Substantive Due Process and the
"Shocks the Conscience" Test
Substantive due process allows federal courts to protect certain
fundamental rights from government interference under the authority of the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. 1°2 The Fourteenth amendment provides that no "State [shall]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' 1 3 Any type of government official or employee, including a police
officer, prison guard, teacher, or high school principal, can perform the
"State" intrusion.1 4 Force is generally considered to be excessive when it
99. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Most interestingly, Justice Breyer, wrote a
dissent in which he argued that the death penalty altogether violates the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 2776-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Glossip decision questions whether long-standing Eighth
Amendment precedents regarding the death penalty should be overruled, beginning with Trop v.
Dulles. Capital punishment will surely be a pertinent topic for the Court in the near future. In
fact, for its October 2015 term, the Court has already granted review on five Eighth Amendment
cases, four of which deal with capital punishment. See Supreme Court of the United States
Granted & Noted List, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/15
grantednotedlist.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); see also October Term 2015, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/15grantednotedlist.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); and
October Term 2015, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-filcs/terms/ot2O15/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2016).
100. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2726.
101. Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., concurring).
102. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state governments from
depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. See Golden Bach v. Anders, 324 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying the Fourteenth
Amendment "shocks the conscience" test to a claim of excessive force by a student against a
principal).
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exceeds the force that a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer
would use under the same circumstances. In excessive-force cases, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects "the right to be free of state intrusions into
realms of personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal,
demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of a court."
10 5
A. The Development of "Shocks the Conscience"
The "shocks the conscience" due process test comes from the 1952
case, Rochin v. California. In Rochin, the Court held that police officers
violated Rochin's due process rights when they directed a doctor to force
an emetic into Rochin's stomach in an effort to obtain evidence. 6 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that conscience shocking conduct
"offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English-speaking peoples.' 0 7 Further, due process of law
requires the state to observe those principles that are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'' 0 8
The Court argued that the police conduct did "more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
too energetically" and held "[t]his is conduct that shocks the
conscience[,] ... offend[ing] even those with hardened sensibilities."',0 9
The shocks-the-conscience standard developed as the analysis for
determining whether State misconduct was so egregious as to violate
substantive due process.
Judge Friendly further defined excessive-force law and the
conscience-shocking standard. In Johnson v. Glick, a pretrial inmate
claimed an officer injured him while he was in custody.'10 The Second
Circuit held that under Rochin, "application of undue force by law
enforcement officers deprives the suspect of liberty without due process of
law."' 11  Judge Friendly rejected the use of the Eighth Amendment,
reasoning that the amendment only applies to claims of persons who have
been convicted and sentenced. 12 In addition, the Second Circuit stated that
the catchall protection of substantive due process within the Fourteenth
105. Hall v. Tawncy, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (1980). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
106. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
107. Id. at 169.
108. id.
109. Id. at 172.
110. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,1032 (2d Cir. 1973).
ll1. Id.
112. Id.
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Amendment applies to pretrial detainees' claims of excessive force." 
3
Glick established that a plaintiff may prove an excessive-force claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment if the plaintiff shows "conduct that shocks the
conscience" under Rochin." 4 Judge Friendly delivered a four-factor test to
determine whether a use of force shocked the conscience:
In determining whether the constitutional line has been
crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for
the application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury
inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 
15
Judge Friendly's test influenced many subsequent excessive-force cases." 
6
The Supreme Court, in 1986, decided Whitley v. Albers, an excessive-
force case brought by prisoners against guards involved in a prison riot."
7
The Court held that convicts must show that the use of force constituted an
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" under the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.118 The Court held
further that in order to meet this standard, the prisoner must focus on the
fourth Glick factor, that the use of force was "maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm." 119 The Court also noted that the
other Glick factors may be used to help infer wantonness: "[E]qually
relevant are such factors as the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of
the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response."'
' 20
113. Id. at 1031.
114. Id at 1033.
115. Id.
116. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (stating lower courts indiscriminately
applied the Glick standard). Courts address an excessive-force claim brought under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 with the inquiry of whether conduct of state officials was so egregious or intolerable as to
shock conscience of the court and constitute a constitutional violation as opposed to a mere
violation of state law. When Does Police Officer's Use of Force During Arrest Become So
Excessive as to Constitute Violation of Constitutional Rights, Imposing Liability Under Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), 60 A.L.R. FED. 204, 3a.
117. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
118. Id.at319.
119. Id.at320-21.
120. Id. at 321.
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The most significant Supreme Court case since Whitley pertaining to
the substantive due process and "shocks the conscience" test did not
encompass the use of force per se, but a high-speed car chase. In
Sacramento County v. Lewis, the Court, in a unanimous decision, reiterated
the shock-the-conscience test, stating that an officer's conduct must be "so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience."' 121 The Lewis Court then held that the level of
culpability required under a "shocks the conscience" standard is context
dependent. 122  The Court reasoned, "[w]hile the measure of what is
conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does. . . 'point the
way.''
, 12 3
Overall, throughout the development of excessive-force law, the
Supreme Court has used a workable "shocks the conscience" test, a
substantive due process test concerned with violations of personal rights so
egregious, so disproportionate to the need presented, that the government
action literally shocked the conscience.
IV. Problem: Eighth Amendment Proportionality Going
Nowhere
The Supreme Court has been reviewing punishments under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause for over more than a century, and yet the
doctrine remains unclear. The Court has also failed to explicitly answer
whether the principle of proportionality is legitimate, leaving Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence confused. Given the Supreme Court's unsettled
views on the principle of proportionality, lower courts are having trouble
interpreting the Court's Eighth Amendment precedents. Such disagreement
within the Court contributes to inconsistent and ineffective interpretations
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Further, the Court today
has-and in the near future will have-an unusual focus on the Eighth
Amendment, particularly with death penalty cases. 124 Therefore, the Court
should have a workable, flexible test to analyze excessive punishments.
The test this Note proposes is a "shocks the conscience" standard with a
proportionality lens.
121. Sacramento Cty. v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). The Court adhered to Rochin,
Whitley, and many other cases that used the "shocks the conscience" test. Id. at 846-47.
122. Id. at 850.
123. Id. at 847 (citing Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick).
124. See Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/l 5grantednotedlist.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); October
Term 2015, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2015/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2016).
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Why is proportionality so important? Proportionality allows courts to
understand and invalidate cruel and unusual punishments that may not be
inherently cruel or unusual. Historically, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause prohibited excessive and barbaric punishments.
Because proportionality review naturally prohibits excessive, barbaric
punishments, the Court should accept and use it today. A punishment is
disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional, if it is greater than what
the wrongdoer deserves. Consequently, the principle of proportionality
increases protection provided to criminal defendants, not society. While
proportionality, by itself, is hard to understand, the Supreme Court has used
"grossly disproportionate" as a common standard. 125  Further,
proportionality review remains objective because it adheres to a greater
societal standard. This allows courts to follow civilized, accepted
standards of the past and present. Therefore, the Court should employ
proportionality within their Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
analyses. However, to put the principle of proportionality into practice, the
Court still needs a standard for guidance.
Thus, there should be an Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine,
and it can and should be rearranged around a "shocks the conscience"
standard similar to what is used in substantive due process review. Within
this test, the Solem factors would become non-decisive guidelines for
determining what shocks the conscience in any given case and courts
would have a workable test to measure proportionality.
V. Proposal: Shocking the Conscience of the Eighth Amendment
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has already implemented a
conscience-shocking standard to determine unusual government
behavior. 126 Courts have previously ruled that behavior that is inhumane,
outrageous, or that shocks the social conscience is cruel and unusual
125. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,449 (2008).
126. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Sitzes v. City of West
Memphis, 606 F.3d 461, 468 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Terrell forecloses inquiry into the situation
objective nature of the emergency, as substantive due process liability turns on the intent of the
government actor."). The Eighth Circuit's en banc panel held that to show conscience-shocking
behavior in emergency circumstances, a plaintiff must show that the officer had an intent-to-harm
unrelated to legitimate purpose, as in Lewis. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 980 (evaluating hot-pursuit
cases under a substantive due process standard). When officers "subjectively believe that they
[are] responding to an emergency," the intent-to-harm standard applies because substantive due
process liability turns on a government official's "evil intent." Courts must "take at face value an
officer's characterization of a situation as an emergency in all but the most egregious cases."
Sitzes, 606 F.3d at 469 (So long as the professed belief is not "preposterous," the court must defer
to the officer's subjective judgment.).
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punishment. 127 In the history of excessive-force cases, the Supreme Court
has used a "shocks the conscience" analysis, a substantive due process test
concerned with violations of personal rights so egregious and so
disproportionate to the need presented that the government action literally
shocked the conscience. Thus, the "shocks the conscience" standard can
and should be used with respect to Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
analysis.
A. "Shocks the Conscience" Within Proportionality
The application of "shocks the conscience" to a specific punishment in
question would be as follows: (1) the court defines the societal conscience
or range of acceptable punishments to the committed crime; (2) the court
measures whether the specific punishment in question is within the
acceptable range; and finally, (3) the court determines whether the
punishment to a committed crime is disproportionate enough to shock the
conscience, or whether the punishment outrages the moral sense of the
community. Here, if the punishment is not within the acknowledged range,
and/or shocks the moral sense of the community, it is cruel and unusual.
The Solem v. Helm factors remain guidelines for determining what shocks
in the conscience in any given case.
In applying the substantive due process "shocks the conscience" test
to determine whether punishments are cruel and unusual, courts would use
the principle of proportionality for all punishments. In order to prove that a
punishment (government conduct) amounted to a substantive due process
violation, a plaintiff must show that the societal moral consensus was
against the sentence or imposed punishment. For example, a prison term so
disproportionate in length compared to the crime of conviction would
always be held to be cruel and unusual. This stems from the longstanding
reasoning that there is a rational proportionality between a crime and its
given sentence. Thus, punishments that shock the conscience are excessive
and grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense committed.
Therefore, a criminal sentence that shocks society's collective conscience
is an unlawful, unconstitutional punishment.
B. Society's Moral Conscience and Its Accepted Range of Punishment
The Court has consistently and unambiguously reiterated its role to
reflect society's evolving, yet prevailing attitudes.128  To mirror such
127. This includes punishments such as castration, crucifixion, and cutting off body parts.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.
1971).
128. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86(1958).
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attitudes, "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" is a clause that is inexact and
open to interpretation. In addition, the Clause prevents the government
from increasing punishments beyond their traditional bounds. For
example, in Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down the
punishment in question, one reason being that the punishment was
inconsistent with the prior practice of the American criminal justice
system. 129 Using the "shocks the conscience" test to interpret cruel and
unusual punishments would allow courts to adapt their interpretations of
excessive punishments to fit contemporary and usual standards of what is
considered decent.
Therefore, the conscience within "shocks the conscience" is society's
present moral consensus. The "shocks the conscience" test remains
objective because the conscience in question is that of the community the
crime was committed, encompassing the jurisdictions of both the federal
government and the states. It is necessary for courts to look at sentencing
practices in all jurisdictions because that helps determine whether a
punishment meets today's conscience or offends fundamental notions of
human dignity. This allows the harshness of sentencing to increase or
decrease over time, depending on the societal conscience. Because state
and federal punishments vary across the board with respect to specific
crimes, there is not one single punishment that fits a certain crime. Instead,
there is a range of reasonableness, and punishments that fall within this
range do not necessarily shock the conscience and are not unusual.
Accordingly, when courts evaluate the sentences imposed by federal
and state jurisdictions, they will determine the range of accepted
punishments. Punishments that are outside the accepted range are
significantly harsher than the societal conscience would permit. Moreover,
it follows that punishments that go astray from prior practice would shock
the conscience as well. Basically, the judiciary branch should overturn
punishments, when compared to the crimes committed, which are outside
the range of what is and what has been accepted. For example, courts and
individuals have articulated that the death penalty is out of proportion to
punishing any other crime than murder and is "the only fitting retribution
for murder."'' 30 The capital punishments that have been overturned have, in
essence, shocked the conscience of the Court.
129. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67, 377 (1910) (noting that "such penalties
for such offences amaze those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state to even
its offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths" and that this
punishment "has no fellow in American legislation").
130. See generally Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1662, 1669 (1986) ("[Execution] is ... the only fitting retribution for murder I can think
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C. Using the Solem v. Helm Factors with "Shocks the Conscience"
In taking apart the words of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, "cruel" is defined as "causing pain or suffering," and "unusual"
means "not habitually or commonly done or occurring."' 31 Common law
dictates that practices that enjoy long usage are presumptively reasonable
and enjoy the consent of the people. Taking the Clause literally would
mean that a painful punishment that is contrary to common usage would be
considered unjust and unconstitutional. Every criminal punishment
involves inflicting some kind of pain or suffering, whether physical or
psychological. Therefore, courts need to determine whether such pain or
suffering is unconstitutionally "unusual." To do so, early courts have
compared a punishment to what has been previously permitted at common
law. 132 This practice comports with the Solem v. Helm factors that guide
courts to determine an acceptable range of sentences accepted in all
jurisdictions.
Likewise, the "shocks the conscience" test does not disregard the
Solem factors that are currently used in cruel and unusual analysis. In
determining whether a punishment shocks the conscience, the Court would
consider the offense's gravity and the stringency of the penalty, how the
punishing jurisdiction punishes its other criminals, and how other
jurisdictions punish the same crime. Furthermore, the factors would be
seen in a conscious shocking light where society's conscience includes
prior experience and current practice.
Because the issue of proportionality is going nowhere under the
current Supreme Court, and the Court's current method of measuring
proportionality is ineffective and unreliable, the "shocks the conscience"
standard being recommended does provide a step towards a resolution.
The proposed approach would provide the Supreme Court with a more
conceivable basis to validate or invalidate certain punishments.
D. Example: Applying the "Shocks the Conscience" Standard to the
Supreme Court's Recent Decisions Regarding Juvenile Offenders
In looking at the Court's most recent Eighth Amendment decisions,
applying the principle of proportionality arranged around a "shocks the
of."); see also Igor Primorac, On Capital Punishment, 17 ISR. L. REV. 133, 138 (1982) (The death
penalty is the proportionate penalty for murder.).
131. POCKET OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 188 (2d ed. 2008) (The word "cruel" means
(1) "taking pleasure in the pain or suffering of others" or (2) "causing pain or suffering"; id. at
921 (The word "unusual" means "not habitually or commonly done or occurring.").
132. See Barker v. The People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); see also Corn v.
Hitchings, 71 Mass. 482, 486 (Mass. 1855).
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conscience" test to each would lay a stronger foundation for their
conclusions. For example, in Roper v. Simmons and Kennedy v. Louisiana,
the Court argued that a societal consensus existed against capital
punishment for juveniles and for non-homicide offenses. 33 Comparably,
the Court in Graham v. Florida claimed to find societal consensus against
LWOP sentences for juvenile non-homicide perpetrators. 34 The Court's
conclusions in such cases may have been misplaced because there actually
was popular public support for the respective punishments in each.
In Roper, Kennedy, and Graham, the Court could not articulate
uniform reasons for the unconstitutionality of the punishments despite
societal acceptance of the death penalty and LWOP applied towards
juvenile offenders. The Court would have been able to justify their
decisions by addressing proportionality in a conscience-shocking lens.
Although the Court in Roper and Kennedy used proportionality in its
analyses, it did not take into account the Solem factors. Using Solem, the
Graham Court reasoned that LWOP for juvenile noncapital offenders is too
severe a punishment, considering the character of juveniles and the nature
of the crime committed. 135 Likewise, the Roper and Kennedy Courts could
have used Solem to justify the harshness of giving the death penalty to
juvenile capital offenders. In other words, the penalties of capital
punishment and LWOP for juvenile offenders are so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of any crime committed by a juvenile.
Implementing such punishments would shock society's sense of justice
because those sentences make no measureable contribution to accepted
penal goals, imposing unnecessary pain and suffering. In all three cases,
the Court would have been able to reason that the proposed punishments
literally shocked the Court's conscience because they were too
disproportionate to the nature of the crimes. Therefore, the Court would
have come to the correct rulings with a "shocks the conscience" test and
would have had more justification in reaching their decisions.
E. Misapplying Substantive Due Process to the Eighth Amendment
To counter this note's proposal, the Eighth Amendment may have a
different purpose and history from substantive due process, so much so that
applying the "shocks the conscience" test is not practical. For one, the
133. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
422-26 (2008) (A death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not
intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.).
134. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
135. Id. at 74-78.
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substantive due process line of attack has rarely been taken. Nonetheless,
at least one scholar has considered a substantive due process challenge to
imprisonment generally.1 36  Justice Marshall also saw the connection
between the death penalty and substantive due process. 137 Therefore, the
groundwork to use substantive due process in typical Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause claims is present.
The Court's decision in Lewis advances the argument that there is a
fundamental right to life infringed upon some punishments, like the death
penalty. In Lewis, the issue before the Court was "whether a police officer
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process
by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a
high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected
offender."' 38 The Court used the "shocks the conscience" test, rather than
legislation. By doing so, the Court acknowledged the right to life in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (although the Court
ultimately found that the police actions did not shock the collective
conscience of the Court).
Another criticism of this note's solution is that "shocks the
conscience" hints at a subjective interpretation and the test is not easily
defined.139 Regardless of the flexibility of the test, the Lewis Court was
able to implement the test articulating, "conduct intended to injure in some
way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action
most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.' 140  Moreover, in
response to the criticism that proportional review merely imposes
subjective preferences of judges, the Supreme Court has held that
proportionality can be measured by "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.'' Under this theory, a
punishment would be forbidden if society developed a moral consensus
against it. Society's consensus may be hard to calculate, but it has been
measured in a number of ways, including looking at what has recently been
136. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994) (arguing the Supreme Court has failed to
recognize the right to physical liberty itself as a fundamental right). "At first glance, this critique
may strike the reader as radical," but nevertheless feel it should be pursued. Id at 783.
137. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 n.141 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("[Eighth Amendment] analysis parallels in some ways the analysis used in striking
down legislation on the ground that it violates Fourteenth Amendment concepts of substantive
due process.").
138. Sacramento Cty. v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
139. Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 849.
141. Trop v. Dullcs, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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enacted by the legislature and what verdicts juries are ultimately agreeing
to. 142
Nonetheless, societal consensus is not clear. Public opinion about any
one punishment is and will most likely be divided. The conscience is more
than popular opinion. It includes justice and what makes up the decencies
of civilized society. In the words of the Lewis Court, conscience-shocking
behavior is "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest., 143  Thus, the Court's self-proclaimed duty to mold
itself to the societal conscience can be achieved.
Further, unlike the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail and Excessive
Fine Clauses, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not clearly
reference proportionality. This is why originalists like Justice Scalia argue
that the Clause does not prohibit disproportionate punishments. 144  In
Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Scalia asserts that the textual basis for
proportionality is implausible because "cruel and unusual" is an
"exceedingly vague and oblique" way to forbid excessive punishments. 45
Nevertheless, when one looks at the history of the Eighth Amendment,
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause forbids excessive
punishments. 146 The Court, in Solem v. Helm, noted that the language of
the Clause originated from the English Bill of Rights and can be read as a
prohibition against excessive or disproportionate punishments. 1
47
Additionally, from the beginning of western civilization to the Framers and
other early Americans, the Clause has been interpreted to encompass
proportionality. 48 Furthermore, the Clause is flexible and "not fastened to
142. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "'Evolving Standards, " 57 UCLA L.
REV. 365, 368-69 (2009) (see, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976)).
For jury verdicts, see McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300; for public-opinion polls, see Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 181 n.25; and for other countries' punishment standards, see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
80, and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-80. Moreover, the Court's reference of
international opinion in its Eighth Amendment decisions has drawn significant controversy and
scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority
in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007).
143. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
144. See supra Section III.B.
145. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991).
146. See also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The
whole inhibition [of the Eighth Amendment] is against that which is excessive.").
147. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983).
148. Aristotle once articulated that justice requires proportionality and that laws that inflict
disproportionate burdens are unjust. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 3 (Roger
Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (350 B.C.E.) ("What is just in this sense, then, is what
is proportionate. And what is unjust is what violates the proportion."). Also, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and New Hampshire all contained explicit references to proportionality in
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the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice., 149 In other words, the Clause changes
with an evolving society. Ultimately, the Court has also followed an
ahistorical approach in interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the
principle of proportionality is justifiable on a historical level.
Conclusion
A proportionality requirement within the Eighth Amendment is
consistent with the goals of criminal law-deterrence, incapacitation and
rehabilitation. However, the current makeup of the Supreme Court cannot
seem to agree on reading the principle of proportionality within the Cruel
and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren
succinctly expressed the nature of the Eighth Amendment: "The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. 150  A "shocks the
conscience" standard for excessive punishments encompasses society's
standard of decency of today and yesterday.
Additionally, the Court and lower courts have already been applying a
workable proportionality test in excessive-force cases that allows for
conformity to the ever-changing societal conscience. Successful excessive-
force claims inherently involve an extreme lack of proportionality in the
use of force, which is conscience shocking. The conscience of the United
States is evolving, and therefore forever changing what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. This is exactly why the flexible test this Note
reiterates may provide the guidance the Court is looking for regarding the
principle of proportionality. In conclusion, prison terms and other forms of
punishments so disproportionate in comparison to the crime, that they
shock the conscience, should be held to be cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
sentencing. N.H. Bill of Rights art. XVIII (1784); Pa. Const. § 38 (1776); S.C. Const. art. XL
(1778).
149. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368, 378 (1910).
150. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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